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RACE AS A FACTOR IN CUSTODY AND ADOPTION
DISPUTES: PALMORE v. SIDOTI

INTRODUCTION

Most courts and state agencies resolve child custody or adoption disputes by selecting the situation which will serve the best interests of the child.' Many states have adopted this best interests
doctrine by statute. 2 A statute typically lists factors that the judge
may consider but usually also allows significant judicial discretion to
examine any other relevant factors. 3 The best interests doctrine requires the court to exercise wide discretion because of the doctrine's
emphasis on the individual child's interests. Public opinion has accepted the risk ofjudicial bias in return for the flexibility and childcentered nature of the approach. 4
In April 1984 the United States Supreme Court decided Palmore
v. Sidoti,5 reversing a Florida court's custody decision involving the
best interests test. The Florida court had transferred custody of a
young child from her mother to her father, ruling that the mother's
interracial remarriage violated the child's best interests. 6 The
Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the Florida court's consideration of the
possible future effects of societal racial bias in modifying a custody
determination.7 The Court's unusual interference with a state custody decision and its application of a constitutional requirement to a
custody proceeding demonstrate Palmore'simportance and its prob1

Note, Child Custody: Determining the Best Interests of the Child, 7J.Juv. L. 135 (1983)

(citing state court cases basing custody decisions on child's best interests); Comment,
Race as a Considerationin Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 256, 256 (1969)

("The states are in unanimous agreement that in adoption and custory [sic] proceedings, the welfare and best interests of the child are paramount." (footnote omitted)).
For an argument that the best interests test needs revision, see Howard, TransracialAdoption: Analysis of the Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503 (1984).
2 See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10124 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3) (West Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.270 (Baldwin 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1983).

3
4

See, e.g., infra note 32.
See Howard, supra note 1, at 545.

5

104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984).

6

"This Court feels that despite the strides that have been made in bettering relations between the races in this country, it is inevitable that Melanie will, if allowed to remain in her present situation and attains [sic]
school age and thus more vulnerable to peer pressures, suffer, from the
social stigmatization that is sure to come."

Id. at 1881 (emphasis and citation omitted).

7

Id. at 1882.
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able impact on custody and adoption placements. 8
I
BACKGROUND

A.

The Equal Protection Clause as Applied to Race

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from discriminating among its citizens because of their
race. 9 To trigger the constitutional protection, state action must occur; because the actions of state courts are state action,' 0 child custody proceedings must obey the fourteenth amendment. States
activate the equal protection clause when they classify groups of
people according to some characteristic. Although a state may
classify individuals as members of a group for the purpose of legislative or judicial action, "the classification must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."" In
most cases this classification must have some rational relationship to
2
a legitimate state purpose.'
When a state classifies people by their race, however, the Constitution requires that the state act pursuant to a compelling state interest and that the classification used be necessary to accomplish the
government's purpose.' 3 In Korematsu v. United States' 4 j ustice Black,
8 Although the Palmoreopinion addresses only child custody decisions, the Court's
reasoning may also apply to adoption proceedings because of the similar analysis used
in both proceedings. See infra notes 30, 50-53 and accompanying text.
9 The equal protection clause holds that "[n]o State shall. . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
Adopted in the wake of the Civil War, the fourteenth amendment was designed to eliminate governmentally-imposed racial discrimination. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10
(1967); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879).
to See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) ("That the action of state courts
and judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment... has long been established by
decisions of this Court.").
11 Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,415 (1920) (striking down state tax
law for arbitrarily discriminating between domestic and foreign corporations).
12 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITTIONAL LAW 591 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as NowAK]. In Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949), for example, the Court found that an ordinance prohibiting general advertising
on vehicles, but allowing advertising relating to the vehicle owner's business did not

violate the equal protection clause. The Court found a rational relationship between the
city's concern for traffic safety and the classification used because the city authorities
could have concluded that advertising one's own business creates a lesser traffic hazard
than advertising another's; therefore, no equal protection violation existed. Id. at 10910.
13 NowAx, supra note 12, at 524; see also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196
(1964) (law must be necessary to accomplishing state goal).
14 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding Korematsu's conviction for unlawfully remain-
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writing for the majority, described race as a "suspect" classification
and stated that a reviewing court "must subject [the legislature's
purpose] to the most rigid scrutiny."' 15 The Court expanded the
strict scrutiny test in 1964 in McLaughlin v. Florida.16 The McLaughlin Court overturned a Florida statute punishing cohabitation between whites and blacks, holding that "[s]uch a law, even though
enacted pursuant to a valid state interest, bears a heavy burden of
justification . . . and will be upheld only if it is necessary, and not
merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible
state policy."' 17 The statute appeared as part of a chapter forbidding
"Adultery and Fornication," and the Court found that the other racially neutral statutes in the chapter adequately served the state's
valid interest in preventing promiscuity.' The Court thus invalidated the statute because the racial classification was not necessary
to accomplish the state's purpose.
The Supreme Court cemented the strict scrutiny test in Loving
v. Virginia.19 An interracial couple who moved to Virginia after
marrying in Washington, D. C., were convicted of violating Virginia's ban on interracial marriage. 20 Because the statute involved a
racial classification, the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny.
Finding no legitimate state purpose for the law, 2 ' the Court declared it unconstitutional and reversed the Lovings' convictions
without investigating the relationship between the racial classifica22
tion and the state's goal.
The number of statutory classifications expressly discriminating
against specific racial groups has dwindled in the aftermath of Loving
ing in restricted area from which Americans ofJapanese descent had been forcibly evacuated during World War II).
15 Id. at 216. The Korematsu decision remains the only case in which the Supreme
Court has upheld a racial classification after applying strict scrutiny. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrUnToNAL LAW 1000 (1978). In Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per
curiam), the Supreme Court affirmed a federal district court decree invalidating Alabama statutes that required racial segregation in prisons. In a separate concurrence,
however, three justices emphasized that "prison authorities have the right, acting in
good faith and in particularized circumstances, to take into account racial tensions in
maintaining security, discipline, and good order in prisons andjails." Id. at 334. These
cases seem to imply that racial classifications are only constitutional in situations involving danger and immediate necessity.
16
379 U.S. 184 (1964).
17 Id. at 185, 194.
18 Id. The Court indicated in dicta that a racially discriminatory statute might be
constitutional if the state could demonstrate that racial factors created the necessity for
disparate treatment. Id. at 193.
19 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
20
Id. at 2-3.
21
Id. at 11. "There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of
invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification."
22
Id. at 11-12.
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and McLaughlin.23 Current equal protection cases often involve
state actions aimed at correcting past discrimination or balancing
the effects of remaining societal prejudice. 24 In Palmore v. Sidoti the
25
Florida court attempted to use just such a balance.
B.

The "Best Interests of the Child" Test in Child
Placement Proceedings

Society has often claimed a special interest in the welfare of
children based on the rationale that children cannot always effectively represent their own interests. 26 In custody and adoption disputes in particular, courts have adopted the role of guardian of the
child's welfare. 27 Custody disputes usually arise when a child's parents divorce and both parents, or occasionally a third party, seek
legal custody of the child. The child becomes caught in the middle
of this adversarial dispute, and the law therefore charges the court
28
with protecting the child's interests.
Adoption decisions are usually routine, uncontested proceedings. 2 9 Agencies, rather than courts, administer adoption placements by screening applicants and choosing custodians for the
23 For example, Nowak, Rotunda, and Young state that "[tihe Court did not consider any race classification cases in the 1978-79 Term.
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109 n.16 (Supp. 1982).
24 See NowAK, supra note 12, at 661-82 (discussing affirmative action programs). In

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), a white student successfully
challenged a medical school admissions policy that reserved a certain number of spaces
in the entering class for minority applicants. Justice Powell, writing for two justices,
reiterated that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and
thus call for the most exacting judicial examination." Id. at 291. Scholars have also
discussed the constitutionality of benign racial classifications in other areas, such as disease testing, see, e.g., Note, Constitutionaland PracticalConsiderationsin Mandatory Sickle Cell
Anemia Testing, 7 U.C.D. L. REV. 509 (1974) (arguing that mandatory testing of blacks for
sickle cell anemia is constitutional), employment, education, and housing, see, e.g.,
Kaplan, EqualJusticein an Unequal World: Equalityfor the Negro--The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966) (examining special treatment in these areas); Hellerstein, The Benign Quota, Equal Protection, and "The Rule in Shelley's Case," 17 RUTGERS L.
REV. 531 (1963) (asserting that quotas aimed at integrating neighborhoods would not
violate Constitution).
25 See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
26 J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
3-4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN]. See, e.g., Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429,
431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925) (court's jurisdiction over custody "has its origin in the
protection that is due to the incompetent or helpless").
27 For an argument that the child should always be represented by legal counsel,
see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 26, at 66-67.
28

For an extensive discussion of custody proceedings, see GOLDSTEN, supra note

26; Foster & Freed, Child Custody (Part 1), 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423 (1964); Note, supra note
1.
29 See L. & E. BROOKS, ADVENTURING IN ADOPTION 45 (1939) (describing filing procedure and later short hearing).
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children. 30 Disputes arise when an applicant contests an agency's
denial of his petition for custodianship. Although the agency may
be less self-interested than a divorced parent seeking custody, the
court remains the only objective guardian of the child's interests. In
both custody disputes and adoption proceedings the court weighs
all relevant factors to determine which home environment will most
31
benefit the child. This process is called the "best interests" test.
1. Application of the Best Interests Test
Many states identify several factors a judge may consider in determining a child's best interests in a custody proceeding, although
the judge does have broad discretion in choosing which factors to
evaluate.3 2 Several of these basic factors have been endorsed by almost every state. Courts always consider the relationship of the parties to the child.33 Most courts prefer the natural parents over other
individuals,3 4 but if the child has established a strong relationship
with another party, that relationship weighs heavily in the party's
favor.3 5 Courts also try to place children in the environment that
will give them the most stability and continuity of care;3 6 in fact,
For an extensive discussion of adoption proceedings, see I. GOODACRE, ADOPPOLICY & PRACTICE (1966) (discussing British adoption practices); A. SOROSKY, A.
BARAN & R. PANNOR, THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE (1978) [hereinafter cited as SOROSKY];
Note, Matchingfor Adoption: A Study of Current Trends, 22 CATH. LAW. 70 (1976) (examining trends in state laws regarding factors adoption agencies should consider when placing child).
31
See Note, supra note 1, at 135 (many factors together form best interests test).
32 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, adopted in eight states, allows the court
to consider "all relevant factors" in "determin[ing] custody in accordance with the best
interest of the child." The Act lists five specific factors. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT
§ 402 (1978).
The Florida statute involved in Palmore allows the court to consider "all factors affecting the best welfare and interests of the child." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3) (West
Supp. 1985). The statute lists nine specific factors the court may consider along with
"[a]ny other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody
dispute." Id. § 61.13(3)(j).
33 Foster & Freed, supra note 28, at 425-27. For a recitation of the parties sometimes involved in custody battles, see Note, supra note 1, at 135.
34 Foster & Freed, supra note 28, at 426 (most states assume "that a parent has a
natural right to his child"); Behn v. Timmons, 345 So. 2d 388, 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977) ("[A] parent has a natural God-given legal right to enjoy the custody, fellowship
and companionship of his offspring. . .[,and] a child's welfare is presumed to be best
served by care and custody by the natural parent.").
35 See Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881) (court continued custody in child's
aunt rather than father because she and child had developed strong relationship over
more than five years child had lived with her); Dickson v. Lascaris, 97 Misc. 2d 610, 411
N.Y.S.2d 995 (1978) (court continued custody in unrelated party rather than grant custody to father because she had cared for three children and developed strong psychological bond with them).
36 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit have developed the concept of the psychological
parent, arguing that a child develops an emotional attachment to the adult who acts as a
parent to him and that bond should not be disturbed. GOLDSTmIN,supra note 26, at 1730

TION
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some experts value these as the most important factors in a child's
healthy development. 3 7 The judge also examines the conduct of all
the parties involved. Destructive behaviors such as excessive drinking or physical abuse weigh heavily against a prospective custodian.3 8 Because divorce is already a difficult ordeal for a child, the
judge usually chooses the custody situation that will allow the child
to maintain interaction with siblings, relatives, and the noncustodial
parent. 39 Courts also consider the physical and mental health of the
adult parties and the child. 40 Finally, courts examine each party's
41
financial status and lifestyle.
Courts tend to agree on the importance of most of the factors
discussed above, but judicial attitudes towards other factors vary.
Some states utilize a "tender years" presumption, a preference for
the mother as custodian of a child under a certain age, 4 2 while other
states have discarded this doctrine. 4 3 Many courts value the preference of the child but vary its weight depending on the child's age
20. See also White v. White, 215 Va. 765, 768, 213 S.E.2d 766, 768 (1975) (child's current home of three years with father provided more "warmth and stability of the home
environment" than mother's apartment which was her tenth residence in three years);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(d) (West Supp. 1985) (court should consider stability and
continuity of child's environment when awarding custody).
37 Howard, supra note 1, at 508 & n.21.
38 See, e.g., Dubicki v. Dubicki, 186 Conn. 709, 717, 443 A.2d 1268, 1272 (1982)
(father's "irresponsibility, drinking, and the physical abuse" of his former wife were sufficient reasons to deny custody); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(f) (West Supp. 1985) (moral
fitness of parent is one factor in custody decision).
39 See, e.g., Glasgow v. Glasgow, 426 P.2d 617, 620 (Alaska 1967) (keeping children
of one family together is desirable); Tschappat v. Kluver, 193 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Iowa
1971) (children should not be separated unless circumstances require); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.13(3)(a) (West Supp. 1985) (court should choose custodial parent who will allow
child more contact with noncustodial parent).
40 See, e.g., Andreesen v. Andreesen, 252 Iowa 1152, 1157, 110 N.W.2d 275, 278
(1961) (mother suffering from paranoia denied custody because of concern for child's
mental health); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(g) (West Supp. 1985) (physical and mental
health of parents relevant to custody decision). But cf. Leisge v. Leisge, 223 Va. 688,
693-94, 292 S.E.2d 352, 355 (1982) (mother's hospitalization for emotional problems
resulting from divorce insufficient to deny her custody).
41 See, e.g., Painter ex rel. Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152
(1966) (court refused custody to father who led unconventional and bohemian lifestyle);
Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981) (change in father's financial status, although
relevant, not sufficient to modify custody award).
42 See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 409 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (mother
awarded custody of three-year old because of tender years doctrine despite residence of
two older children with father); Grubbs v. Grubbs, 5 Kan. App. 2d 694, 696, 623 P.2d
546, 549 (1981) (age of two-year old child and need for maternal care tip balance for
mother).
43 See, e.g., Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981) (rejecting tender years
presumption as unconstitutional gender-based discrimination); Lane v. Lane, 446 A.2d
418, 419 (Me. 1982) (noting Maine court has never sanctioned use of rebuttable presumption in favor of mother).
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and maturity. 44 Other courts refuse to force a child to choose between her parents. 4 5 In the past, courts often removed children
from the custody of a parent who committed adultery or cohabitated
after divorce. 4 6 Today most courts require proof that the child has
47
suffered some adverse effect before ordering such a change.
Courts also disagree on the treatment of race and religion in
custody and adoption proceedings. Both factors have raised constitutional issues in other areas of the law, and some courts have concluded that constitutional principles preclude consideration of race
and religion in custody and adoption proceedings. 48 Otherjurisdictions, however, have used racial and religious factors to determine
49
child placement.
The best interests test applies to adoption placements as well as
custody decisions. 5 0 The application of the test in adoption placements differs from its application in custody decisions, however, because the decisionmaker chooses parents, rather than choosing
between two biological parents. The adoption placement is accomplished by "matching" the child with suitable custodians. "Matching" requires placing a child with parents who are similar to the
child in certain basic characteristics. 5 1 Although many of the factors
44 See, e.g., Goldstein v. Goldstein, 115 R.I. 152, 341 A.2d 51 (1975) (judge considered 9 1/2 year old child's preference)- FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(i) (West Supp. 1985)
(court should consider child's preference if child is of "sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a preference").
45 For a discussion of the problems involved in asking a child's preference, see J.
AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 555 n.2 (1978); Schowalter, Views on the

Role of the Child's Preference in Custody Litigation, 53 CONN. BJ. 298 (1979).
46 See, e.g., Spaulding v. Spaulding, 278 N.W.2d 639 (S.D. 1979) (mother's marital
misconduct committed in children's presence sufficient to deny her custody).
47 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Moore, 35 Colo. App. 280, 282, 531 P.2d 995, 997
(1975) (mother's cohabitation caused no detrimental effect to child and therefore was
not grounds to deny her custody); Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975) (adultery
insufficient cause to deny custody unless directly bearing on child's welfare).
48 See, e.g., Beazley v. Davis, 92 Nev. 81, 545 P.2d 206 (1976) (equal protection
forbids consideration of race); Munoz v. Munoz, 79 Wash. 2d 810,489 P.2d 1133 (1971)
(court could not deprive father of his first amendment right to supervise his children's
religious upbringing absent showing of harm to children). A more complete discussion
of religion as a factor in custody cases is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion
of the issue, however, see Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance on Best Interests May Be Unconstitutional. Religion as a Factorin Child Custody Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 25 (1981). The
constitutional ramifications of race as a factor in custody decisions are discussed infra
text accompanying notes 93-105.
49 See, e.g., Ward v. Ward, 36 Wash. 2d 143, 216 P.2d 755 (1950) (black father retained custody of biracial children because they appeared black); Burnham v. Burnham,
208 Neb. 498, 304 N.W.2d 58 (1981) (father awarded custody because of mother's religious beliefs).
50
Note, supra note 30, at 70 n.2. The Florida adoption statute requires the court to
determine "that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption" before
entering a final decree. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.131 (West 1969).
51
Note, supra note 30, at 70.
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considered in custody proceedings are also applied to the matching
process, race, religion, and age are usually the three primary criteria. 52 Because of the emphasis on matching, decisionmakers rarely
consider race irrelevant. 5 3 The use of race in adoption decisions,
however, raises many of the same constitutional issues as its use in
custody decisions.
2.

Race and the Determination of the Best Interests of the Child

Racial factors can become important considerations in custody
determinations when a uniracia 54 couple divorces and one parent
remarries someone of another race 55 or when an interracial couple
divorces and the placement of their biracial child is at issue. 5 6 In the
case of a uniracial couple, the racial issue usually surfaces when one
parent seeks a modification of the custody decree because the custodial parent has remarried an individual of a different race. 57 In seeking modification of the custody decree the complaining parent must
demonstrate that a substantial change in circumstances has altered
the best interests of the child.5 8 The noncustodial parent may argue
that the remarriage has created a substantial change in the child's
circumstances because membership in an interracial family will subject the child to societal prejudice. Although other factors may contribute to the alleged changed circumstances, the racial issue usually
52 Id. at 71. In the past, matching also considered hair and eye color, I.Q., and
temperament. Id. at 70 n.6.
53
See id. at 72 ("It is uniformly agreed that it is in the best interests of a black child
to be placed in a black home if one is available.").
54
The terms "uniracial," "interracial," and "biracial" are used throughout this
Note. "Uniracial" refers to a person of one race or a couple, both of whom are of the
same race. "Interracial" indicates a couple consisting of persons of different races. "Biracial" refers to the mixed race offspring of an interracial marriage.
Most of the cases discussed in this Note involve black/white racial conflicts. Some
of the articles discussed, however, address the plight of other minority groups; for example, Howard, supra note 1, discusses adoption of Native American children.
55
E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S. Ct. 1875 (1984) (see infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text); Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 450 Pa. 352, 299 A.2d 243
(1973) (see infra note 66 and accompanying text).
56 E.g., Fountaine v. Fountaine, 9 Ill. App. 2d 482, 133 N.E.2d 532 (1956) (involving placement of two children of black father and white mother); Brokenleg v. Butts, 559
S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (involving placement of child of white father and
Native American mother).
57 The issue of race can also arise in the initial determination of custody if one of
the parents has already formed a relationship with a member of a different race.
58 Palmore, 104 S. Ct. at 1880. The change in circumstances can occur in either the
petitioner's or the child's situation, Fungaroli v. Giles, 414 So. 2d 1176, 1178 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982), but it must be material or substantial. E.g., Adams v. Adams, 385 So. 2d
688, 689 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (petitioner's remarriage and increased wealth insufficient to satisfy requirement); Berlin v. Berlin, 369 So. 2d 434, 435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (stability of father's home compared with mother's planned move satisfied requirement). The petitioner carries the burden of proving the substantial change.
Walfish v. Walfish, 383 So. 2d 274, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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predominates. 5 9
The cases involving biracial children focus on slightly different
issues. The problem of social prejudice is not material in a biracial
child custody case because the child, born into an interracial family,
would have encountered racial prejudice even if his parents had
never divorced. The controversy with biracial children, therefore,
usually revolves around the child's sense of identity. The minority
parent often fears the child will lose identification with the minority
culture, resulting in a loss of self-esteem, if the other parent gains
custody. 60 Although the uniracial and biracial cases raise different
issues, courts tend to treat race in both situations in one of three
ways: as the determinative factor, as one factor among many, or as
61
totally irrelevant to the custody decision.
Although many trial courts continue to base custody decisions
solely on racial factors, 62 most appellate courts only allow consideration of race as one factor in the decision. 63 Some appellate courts,
however, have approved the use of race as the dispositive factor in
child placement, 64 usually in placing biracial children, because of
the special problems these children encounter as a result of their
59 See, e.g., Palmore (discussed infra text accompanying notes 74-86) (petitioner
claimed his ex-wife's interracial remarriage and other factors altered their child's best
interests; court focused on interracial marriage).
60 The court in Raysor v. Gabbey, 57 A.D.2d 437, 395 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1977), recognized these concerns, although the factual situation differed from the one discussed
here. Id. at 441-42, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 294-95. See also the discussion of identity in
Farmer v. Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d 137, 439 N.Y.S.2d 584, 586 (1981).
61 The court in Farmer v. Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d at 143-44, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 588,
described these three categories.
62 Because many appellate courts mention the use of race as a determinative factor
in reversing trial opinions, apparently trial courts still treat race as the deciding factor.
See, e.g., Boone v. Boone, 90 N.M. 466, 468, 565 P.2d 337, 339 (1977) (mother's relationship with black man cannot be determinative of best interests of children); Langin v.
Langin, 2 Ill. App. 3d 544, 276 N.E.2d 822 (1971) (race cannot be determinative).
63 See, e.g., Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d at 146, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 589. In White v. Appleton,
53 Ala. App. 702, 304 So. 2d 206 (1974), a mother had left her child with the child's
grandmother for two years and then moved out of the state, where she married interracially. The appellate court refused the mother's request to move the child to this new
home because it feared that the lack of mother-child contact, the new location, and the
stepfather of a different race could make the relocation "prove to be a traumatic experience" for the child. Id. at 705, 304 So. 2d at 209. Thus, combined with other factors,
the mother's interracial marriage was properly considered in determining the child's
best interests. See also Dickson v. Lascaris, 97 Misc. 2d 610, 411 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Fam. Ct.
1978). In Dickson, a New York trial court continued the custody of three black children
in a third party rather than their black father because one of the children had special
needs resulting from neurosurgery, the third party had cared for the children for many
years while their father had abandoned them, and the father had remarried a white woman. Id. at 613-15, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 997-99. The court did not find the racial issue
particularly significant, but it "note[d] the social implications of such a family situation
and its potential impact on the children." Id. at 616, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
64 Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d at 143-44, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
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mixed racial heritage. 65 Other courts have eliminated the consideration of race as a factor in custody decisions. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, for example, has argued that if the children are
"raised in a happy and stable home, they will be able to cope with
prejudice and hopefully learn that people are unique individuals
who should be judged as such." 6 6 In spite of isolated appellate decisions that eliminate race from consideration or allow its use as the
determinative factor for a biracial child, a majority of appellate
67
courts view race as one factor among many in a custody decision.
68
Race has long been a consideration in adoption cases as well,
and scholars have debated its proper role in adoption proceedings
as hotly as in custody cases. 6 9 Generally, the same divisions in
thought exist in adoption cases as in custody proceedings, although
many child placement specialists argue that race is somewhat more
70
relevant to adoption placements because of matching concerns.
65
Id. In Raysor v. Gabbey, 57 A.D.2d 437, 395 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1977), a New York
appellate court decided that the controversy between the black father and white maternal grandparents of a biracial child turned on "the ability of the custodian to recognize
the stresses arising through racial differences and deal with them intelligently." Id. at
442, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 294-95. The father had argued that his daughter would be better
off with him because she appeared black and her grandparents had placed her in an allwhite school, while he lived in a racially integrated neighborhood. The appellate court
agreed that the racial issue could be determinative but remanded the case to the family
court for further findings, including investigations by social workers into the suitability
of each party's environment. Id. at 442-44, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 294-96.
Another example of determinative treatment of race occurred in Ward v. Ward, 36
Wash. 2d 143, 216 P.2d 755 (1950). The Supreme Court of Washington upheld the trial
judge's determination that a black father should retain custody of the two daughters of
his interracial marriage because the children physically appeared black. The judge
stated that the children would "have a much better opportunity to take their rightful
place in society if they [were] brought up among their own people," and, therefore,
placement with their father was in the children's best interests. Id. at 145, 216 P.2d at
756. Palmore, discussed infra text accompanying notes 74-86, is one of the few cases
involving a uniracial child.
Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 450 Pa. 352, 355-56, 299 A.2d 243,
66
246 (1973) (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 221 Pa. Super. 196, 207,
289 A.2d 202, 207 (1972) (Hoffman, J., dissenting)).
67
See Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d at 156, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 589 (summarizing different court
rules).
68
Grossman, A Child of a Different Color: Race as a Factorin Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFFALO L. REV. 303, 304 (1967).
69 See, e.g., id. (ideally race should not influence adoption decision, but some situations require consideration of race in order to serve child's best interests); Comment,
supra note 1 (interracial adoption should be encouraged); Comment, The InterracialAdoption Implications of Drummond v. Fulton County Department of Family and Children
Services, 17 J. FAM. L. 117 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, InterracialAdoption]
(adoption agencies and courts should not base adoption decisions entirely on racial considerations); Comment, Racial Matching and the Adoption Dilemma: Alternativesfor the Hard
to Place, 17 J. FAM. L. 333 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Racial Matching] (race
should play some role in adoption decisions, but child's best interests must be decisive

factor).
70

See Comment, InterracialAdoption, supra note 69, at 151; Comment, RacialMatch-
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Studies reveal that adopted children struggle with their sense of
identity and self-worth, 7 ' and the imposition of racial differences
may only traumatize the child further. Thus, many specialists believe that the race and racial attitudes of potential adoptive parents
are crucial to a placement decision. 72 As in custody cases, most appellate courts have held that racial matching and parental attitudes
towards race are not determinative factors but are only two factors
73
among many to consider in selecting an adopting family.
II
PALMORE V. SiDoTi: THE PROCEEDINGS

Linda and Anthony Sidoti were divorced in Florida in May 1980
with Linda receiving custody of their three year old daughter. 74 In
September 1981 Anthony filed to modify the custody order, alleging
a change in the child's living conditions. 75 Under Florida law, the
party seeking to modify an existing custody order must prove that
some condition affecting the child's life has "substantial[ly]
change[d]. ' '7 6 In this case the conditions cited included the
mother's cohabitation with, and subsequent marriage to, a black
man, Clarence Palmore, Jr. The father also alleged that the mother
77
had failed to provide proper care for the child.
ing, supra note 69, at 333. For a discussion of the special concerns in adoption cases see
supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
71 For a more complete discussion of the unique problems of interracial adoptees,
see SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 33-45, 202-04; Grossman, supra note 68, at 327-35; Comment, Racial Matching, supra note 69, at 355-63; Note, supra note 30.
72 See Raysor v. Gabbey, 57 A.D.2d 437, 442, 395 N.Y.S.2d 290, 294-95 (1977);
Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 450 Pa. 352, 356, 299 A.2d 243, 245 (1973).
73 See, e.g., In re RMG & EMG, 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982) (although race is significant factor in adoption, it is not determinative); In re Adoption of a Minor, 228 F.2d 446,
448 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (race alone "cannot be decisive in determining the child's welfare"); Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. La. 1972) ("we regard the
difficulties inherent in interracial adoption as justifying consideration of race as a relevant factor in adoption, and not as justifying race as the determinative factor"). But cf.
Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1205
(5th Cir. 1977) (race can "be taken into account, perhaps decisively if it is the factor
which tips the balance between two potential families"), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
For a good discussion of these cases, see Comment, Racial Matching, supra note 69, at
343-52; Grossman, supra note 68.
74 Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1880 (1984).
75 Id.
76

"The court.

. .

shall have continuingjurisdiction.

. .

to modify.

. .

when such

is found to be necessary by the court because there has been a substantial change in the
circumstances of the parties." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(1)(a) (West Supp. 1985). As
written, this provision only applies to judicial modification of child support obligations.
Florida courts, however, routinely apply this analysis when considering a modification of
child custody. See, e.g., Stearns v. Szikney, 386 So. 2d 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Adams v. Adams, 385 So. 2d 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). See also supra note 58 for an
explanation of the phrase "substantial change in circumstances."
77 104 S.Ct. at 1880.
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The trial court found that the quality of child care provided by
the two households would be similar and concluded that the important difference between the two homes arose from the mother's interracial marriage. 78 The judge believed the child would inevitably
suffer social stigmatization as a member of an interracial family and,
therefore, found that the child's best interests dictated awarding
79
custody to the father.
The trial court's ruling followed a long-standing Florida precedent most recently applied in the 1974 case of Niles v. Niles.80 The
Niles trial court had changed custody of two children from their
mother to their father. In addition to the mother's emotional instability and the children's worsening conduct, the trial court focused
on the mother's pending interracial marriage, describing the
mother's choice of an interracial lifestyle as "unacceptable to the
father of the children and to the society in which we live." 8 1 The
appellate court affirmed this decision because the possible effects of
the interracial marriage were not the sole basis for the trial court's
opinion.8 2 In Palmore the trial court applied the reasoning of Niles
and awarded custody to the father.8 3 -The Florida Second District
84
Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of
"important federal concerns arising from the Constitution's commitment to eradicating discrimination based on race." 8 5 Although
recognizing that state custody determinations are not ordinarily
within its purview, the Court found that the state court's racially
based decision violated the equal protection clause. The Supreme
Court reversed the Florida order and returned custody to the
86
mother.
78
Id. at 1880-81. The trial court identified two other factors used in its analysis:
(1) the father's resentment of the mother's selection of a black partner, which the court
described as "not sufficient" to remove custody from the mother and (2) the mother's
cohabitation with her partner. The trial court reasoned that the second factor was "of
some significance" because it demonstrated the mother's tendency "to place gratification of her own desires ahead of her concern for the child's future welfare." Id. at 1881.
79 Id.
80 299 So. 2d 162 (Fla. 1974).

81

Id. at 162.

Id. at 162-63.
104 S. Ct. at 1881.
426 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1983). The Florida Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to
review an appellate court decision that merely affirms a lower court holding. FLA.
CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3); Jenkins v. Florida, 385 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (Fla. 1980) ("This
court may only review a decision of a district court of appeal that expressly and directly
conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal or the Supreme Court on the
same question of law . . . . The single word 'affirmed' comports with none of these
definitions.").
85 Palmore, 104 S. Ct. at 1881.
86 Id. at 1881-82.
82
83
84
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III
ANALYSIS

A.

The Supreme Court's Holding in Palmore v. Sidoti

The brevity8 7 of the Court's unanimous opinion indicates that
the Supreme Court found Palmore v. Sidoti 88 an easy application of
equal protection principles. The Court rejected the Florida court's
use of the possible effects of racial prejudice to remove an infant
child from the custody of her natural mother.8 9 Although it acknowledged that the state has a compelling interest in awarding custody based on the best interests of the child, and even that an
interracial home may create additional pressures for a child,9 0 the
Court refused to sanction judicial consideration of societal prejudice
in custody proceedings. Noting that the fourteenth amendment was
designed to eliminate racial discrimination by state governments,
the Court stated, "Private biases may be outside the reach of the
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." 9 1
Unfortunately, the narrow language and brief analysis in the
Palmore opinion do not reveal the extent of the Court's holding.
The final sentence of the Palmore decision demonstrates the opinion's narrow application: "The effects of racial prejudice, however
real, cannot justify a classification removing an infant child from the
custody of its natural mother found to be an appropriate person to
have such custody." 92 The Palmore holding addresses a custody battle in which the result turns solely on the possible effects of racial
prejudice, but it apparently does not prohibit all consideration of
race or racial issues in custody proceedings. The question whether
courts can still consider racial issues other than the problems generated by social prejudice remains unanswered.

87 The opinion occupies fewer than three pages in the Supreme Court Reporter.
88 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984).
89 "Whatever problems racially-mixed households may pose for children in 1984
can no more support a denial of constitutional rights than could the stresses that residential integration was thought to entail in 1971." Id. at 1882 (referring to Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1971), in which the Court invalidated a Kentucky statute which
prohibited blacks from buying homes in white neighborhoods). Although the trial court
considered other factors in addition to the problems of societal prejudice the child
might experience, the Supreme Court concluded that race was the dispositive factor,
stating that "it is clear that the outcome would have been different had petitioner married a Caucasian male of similar respectability." Id. at 1881.
90

104 S. Ct. at 1882.

91 Id. For a more complete discussion of equal protection principles, see supra
notes 9-25 and accompanying text.
92 104 S.Ct. at 1882.
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Other Possible Racial Considerations in Child
Custody Cases

In some instances courts may need to examine racial issues to
serve a child's best interests. The Palmore holding would not prohibit judicial consideration of racial factors in three commonly occurring situations. Each of these cases involves effects on a specific
child in a particular environment and therefore avoids the broad
classification prohibited by the equal protection clause.
First, the judiciary can properly consider racial prejudice in custody decisions when it causes actual harm to the child. In Palmore
the father objected to the mother's custody because of the possible
future effects of racial prejudice directed at the child because of the
mother's interracial marriage. 9 3 The Supreme Court's rejection of
this prospective argument of possible future harm should not preclude a judge from considering racial factors that have caused demonstrable harm to a child. If in the future the father were to
present objective evidence that the child had suffered some detriment because of the interracial family situation, judicial reconsideration of the initial custody award would be required to protect the
94
child's best interests.
A second situation not addressed by the Court's holding in Palmore concerns actual parental prejudice. Palmore prohibits only the
consideration of generalized societal prejudice when a court awards
custody. 9 5 Prospective racial prejudice will arise most dramatically
when a natural parent is prejudiced against the other parent's
spouse, or vice versa. 9 6 In evaluating which natural parent should
receive custody, the courts must consider the possibility that the
prejudice of a spouse or natural parent might hinder the child's rela97
tionship with the other natural parent.
Id. at 1881.
See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. Courts properly consider such factors as the child's academic performance, psychological well-being, and behavior. See,
e.g., J. AREEN, supra note 45 at 102-05 (1983 Supp.) (discussing hypothetical case, Rose v.
Rose, based on actual case in which court allowed reexamination because child was emotionally unstable and depressed); Note, The Best Interests Doctrine: Its Application in Divorce,
Modification & Non-ParentalCustody Disputes, 8 J. Juv. L. 184, 188 (1984) (court considers
child's educational needs in modifying custody decree).
95 See Palmore, 104 S. Ct. at 1882 & n.3. The Court's language is somewhat ambiguous; however, the four cases cited by the Court involved racial classifications that were
justified solely on the grounds of vague hypothetical dangers caused by widespread racial intolerance. It appears that this societal prejudice was the Court's greatest concern
in Palmore.
96
In Palmore, for example, the white father was prejudiced against the black stepfather. Appellant's Petition for Certiorari, Appendix A at 25-27, Palmore v. Sidoti, 104 S.
Ct. 1879 (1984).
97 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(a) (West Supp. 1985) lists "[t]he parent who is
more likely to allow the child frequent and continuing contact with the nonresidential
93
94
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The third example not prohibited by Palmore involves the special problems encountered by a mixed-race child of an interracial
marriage. These biracial children encounter certain stresses because of their mixed racial heritage, ranging from confusion over
self-identity to societal hostility toward their biracial ancestry. 98
Child specialists have developed substantial evidence indicating that
the custodian's ability to cope with these specialized problems is
crucial to serving a biracial child's best interests. 9 9 In making these
custody decisions courts ignore the racial characteristics of the parties and only compare each parent's ability to care for the child's
special psychological needs. The biracial situation differs from the
two discussed above because the court's analysis does not deal directly with the harmful effects of racial discrimination in comparing
the two alternative placements and thus clearly falls outside the Palmore holding.10 0
In addition to not violating the Palmore holding, judicial use of
racial factors in each of the above discussed examples is constitutional under standard equal protection analysis.' 0 ' In each case, the
limited use of race should not trigger equal protection strict scrutiny
because the court
is not using broad classifications to favor one race
"overanother. 10 2 Instead, it uses the specific racial issue
as one factor in comparing the two potential households and their ability to
care for the child's needs. Because no racial classification occurs,
strict scrutiny does not apply.
Even if this use of racial factors does trigger strict scrutiny, the
requirements of the equal protection clause are still satisfied. First,
the Supreme Court in Palmore acknowledged that the state's interest
in using the best interests test in child custody placements is a compelling one. 10 3 Second, the use of the racial factors enumerated
above is necessary to accomplish the state's purpose, and the state
parent" as one factor affecting the child's best interests. Grossman discusses this problem in the context of nonparents turning the child against parents. Grossman, supra
note 68, at 326.
98 See Raysor v. Gabbey, 57 A.D.2d 437, 442, 395 N.Y.S.2d 290, 294-95 (1977);
Farmer v. Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d 137, 141, 144-45, 439 N.Y.S.2d 584, 586, 588 (1981).
99 Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d at 140-43, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 586-87.
100 See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 9-22 and accompanying text.
102
See supra notes 11, 15, 18 and accompanying text; see also Johnson, Cross-Racial
Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 934, 984 & n.278 (1984) (arguing that racial classification that does not disadvantage anyone does not violate equal
protection).
103
Palmore, 104 S. Ct. at 1882. The Supreme Court described the state's goal as
"indisputably a substantial governmental interest." Although this language is somewhat
ambiguous, the remainder of the opinion demonstrates that the Court concluded that
the first requirement of strict scrutiny was satisfied. Id. See supra notes 13,19-21 and
accompanying text.
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could not reasonably use any less intrusive means to accomplish the
goal. Although the Court's discussion of the second requirement of
strict scrutiny analysis in Palmore is rather limited, 10 4 nothing in the
opinion suggests that the Court rejects the analysis that numerous
child care experts, state legislatures, and courts have endorsed, that
a child's special racial needs must be considered if a placement decision is truly to serve that child's best interests. 10 5
C.

The Application of Palmore v. Sidoti to Adoption Cases

The final concern left unanswered by the Palmore court is the
decision's applicability to adoption. Adoption involves certain concerns that do not arise in custody determinations, which have led
judges to treat the two proceedings differently.' 0 6 The court assumes a more active role in adoption than in custody proceedings
because the child has no available natural parents. The court attempts to place the child, who may have already developed her own
beliefs and values, with a compatible family; this process is known as
matching.' 0 7 In interracial adoptions, many courts emphasize the
child's need for racial identity.' 0 8 The attitudes of adopting parents
may especially influence the struggling child. To minimize the
child's self-identity crisis, decisionmakers attempt to select families
who will expose the child to culturally-diverse experiences. 0 9
Although Palmore addresses only the child custody problem,
nothing in the opinion suggests that a different analysis would apply
to adoption proceedings. Therefore, the possible effects of societal
racial prejudice should no longer be considered in adoption placement. Other racial issues affecting the best interests of the individual child, however, should remain valid under the rationale
developed above."10
The brevity of the Court's opinion in Palmore provides little guidance for lower courts facing other equal protection questions concerning child placement. Each of the situations discussed above
illustrates the variety of factual settings confronting courts in custody and adoption proceedings and demonstrates the crucial impor104
The Court did not explicitly identify why the trial court's analysis failed the second part of the standard. See supra notes 13, 16-18 and accompanying text.
105 See supra notes 60, 98-99 and accompanying text.
106 See supra notes 51-53, 68-73 and accompanying text.
107
"Matching refers to the practice of placing a child with adoptive parents who,
based upon a number of factors, are similar to the child's biological parents." Note,
supra note 30, at 70 (footnotes omitted); see also supra notes 51-52 and accompanying
text.
108 Studies show that adoptees already experience self-identity problems and that
racial factors may complicate the situation even further. See supra note 71.
109 See SOROSKY, supra note 30, at 203-04.
110 See supra text accompanying notes 93-105.
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tance of an individualized assessment of the factors pertinent to a
child's best interests. Judges must therefore not be constrained by
inflexible rules that prohibit the consideration of relevant racial issues. Palmore clearly prohibits the consideration of race in certain
situations; however, the Court has not foreclosed the possibility that
a specific racial consideration is constitutional and in the best interests of the child.
D.

Potential Effects of Palmore v. Sidoti on the
Best Interests Doctrine

Palmorev. Sidoti stands out as one of the few child custody cases
decided by the Supreme Court."' It is especially significant because it applies a constitutional limitation to the best interests test.
This application of equal protection principles indicates that the
Court may similarly restrict the best interests analysis to protect
other constitutional rights. For example, courts have long considered parental religious, associational, and political affiliations in
making child placement decisions. 112 These considerations implicate the parents' exercise of their first amendment rights and therefore may warrant similar treatment to the issues involving
fourteenth amendment rights. " 3 Although a more thorough examination of first amendment rights exceeds the scope of this Note, Palmore may strengthen these rights.
Palmore may affect the best interests doctrine even more fundamentally than just by forbidding consideration of certain factors that
abridge constitutionally protected rights. Supporters of the doctrine cite its grant ofjudicial discretion to focus solely on the child's
interests as a major advantage. 1 4 After Palmore, if a judge considers
even one factor affecting a constitutional right of a party, the losing
party may have grounds for appeal. Thus, Palmore may cause an erosion of the best interests doctrine's flexibility and increase the
number of appeals, encouraging states to abandon the doctrine and
search for less discretionary methods of determining child
placement. 115
1"I

104 S. Ct. at 1881.

See Mangrum, supra note 48, at 55-74 (discussing considerations of religious factors as part of best interests doctrine).
113
First amendment rights may be limited for a number of reasons. See NowAX,
supra note 12, at 857-1081.
114 See Howard, supra note 1, at 545 (discretionary best interests test correctly focuses on individual child).
115 A number of states and scholars have expressed displeasure with the discretionary best interests doctrine and have supported a return to presumptions or more specific
rules. In Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981), for example, the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted the presumption for the primary caretaker. The presumption will favor the parent who has cared for the child on a daily basis. Only if the
112
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CONCLUSION

Palmore v. Sidoti may herald great change in the fields of child
custody and adoption. Although the Court's constitutional analysis
is not entirely clear, Palmore certainly forbids consideration of the
possible effects of societal racial prejudice in a custody decision.
Whether the court intends to prohibit the use of all racial issues remains unclear. This Note suggests that some racial issues which directly affect the well-being of the child should survive constitutional
scrutiny. The judiciary should continue to use the flexible best interests test to safeguard the welfare of children facing custody and
adoption proceedings even if that test requires the evaluation of racial factors in the specialized situations discussed in this Note.
Eileen M. Blackwood

child has had no primary caretaker will the court actually choose between the two parents. This presumption replaces similar doctrines, such as the tender years presumption, which favored the mother over the father. See also Howard, supra note 1 passim
(advocating a best interests test broken down into subparts).

